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A "FAMILIAR" STANDARD OF CARE: WHAT THE SAME OR 
SIMILAR COMMUNITIES STANDARD COULD MEAN FOR 
MARYLAND. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Picture yourself as a doctor with years of training and experience, 
treating a patient. You discuss with your patient the risks and 
benefits of a test you could perform that would screen for a disease. 
The patient refuses, and you do not order the test. You later find out 
that the patient has this disease when a medical malpractice claim is 
brought against you. In states that use a "locality rule" for medical 
malpractice cases, if the standard practice in that area was to order 
the test without asking the patient, you could be held liable for a 
failure to meet the standard of care even if your decision was the 
most prudent by national standards.' 
Imagine instead, the more likely scenario, that you are a patient. 
You begin to experience what you believe to be adverse effects of a 
procedure you underwent at a hospital, so you do some research. 
You find that the procedure is no longer practiced in most hospitals 
across the country because of the same effects you are experiencing. 
You bring a medical malpractice claim against your health care 
provider and retain an expert witness who will testify that ordering 
the procedure violated the national standard of care. In a locality rule 
state, you will likely be uncompensated ifthe procedure is commonly 
ordered in your health care provider's medical community. In fact, 
your expert's testimony will probably be excluded for failing to 
address the relevant standard of care. 2 
Maryland has wisely operated under the national standard of care 
since 1975.3 In 1993, the Maryland General Assembly passed House 
Bill 1359, which was intended to reform the small group health 
insurance market. 4 A provision in this bill, dealing with the legal 
1. See Amy Lynn Sorrel, Liability by Locality: Practical Standard or Outdated Notion?, 
AM. MED. NEWS (Jan. 18, 2010), http://www.ama-assn.orglamednews/ZOlO/01l18 
/prsaOI18.htm. Physician Daniel J. Merenstein, MD, was involved in such a case. 
See id. 
2. See infra Part II.C.l. 
3. See infra Part III.B. 
4. See Maria S. LoBianco et aI., A Model for Case Management of High Cost Medicaid 
Users, NURSING ECON., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 303-07, 314, available at http:// 
findarticles.comlp/articles/mi_mOFSW/is _ nS _ v 14/ai_ n 18607072/. 
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standard of care for medical malpractice cases in Maryland, was 
added with little-to-no discussion, and went unnoticed by many. 5 
The provision added new language to the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, stating that health care 
providers would only be held to the standard of care in the "same or 
similar communities" as that of the health care provider. 6 While this 
language was added in 1993, its meaning and effect are still in debate 
because it is in direct conflict with Maryland's national standard, 
previously established by common law.7 The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland recently addressed this issue and provided its 
guidance as to how the statute should be applied.8 
This comment will focus on the effect the "same or similar 
communities" language in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article9 will have on the standard of care in medical malpractice 
cases in Maryland. Part II provides background on how the standard 
of care operates,IO describes the three different types of standards, II 
and explains why it is critical for the legal standard of care to be 
clearly defined for both plaintiffs 12 and physicians. 13 The 
consequences of an unclear standard for plaintiffs will be illustrated 
using North Carolina's application of a same or similar communities 
standard and examining the problems that have arisen there. 14 Part III 
chronicles the evolution of Maryland's standard of care jurisprudence 
from common law before 1975,15 to the recent Court of Special 
Appeals decision in Daee v. Lucas. 16 Part IV details the possible 
decisions the Court of Appeals of Maryland could make as to the 
standard of care issue,17 and ends by imploring the court that if it 
insists on applying a same or similar communities rule for Maryland, 
5. See Dan J. Loden, Community Standard in Health Law May Burden Malpractice 
Plaintiffs, THE DAILY RECORD, Sept. 18, 1993, at 11 (noting that the legislation was 
likely pushed by lobbyists for the insurance industry). The bill was primarily focused 
on health insurance issues, not medical malpractice law. See LoBianco et aI., supra 
note 4. 
6. 1993 Md. Laws 529, 546. 
7. See infra Part III.B.3. 
8. See discussion of Daee v. Lucas, No. 2485 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 15,2011) infra 
Part IILE. 
9. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-02(c)(I) (LexisNexis 2011). 
10. See infra Part II.A. 
11. See infra Part II.B. 
12. See infra Part II.C. 
13. See infra Part lLD. 
14. See infra Part II.C.2. 
15. See infra Part lILA. 
16. See infra Part IILE. 
17. See infra Part IV.A. 
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it should establish clear guidelines for applying the standard as soon 
as possible in order to avoid problems exemplified by North 
Carolina. 18 
II. IMPORTANCE OF A CLEAR STANDARD OF CARE 
A. The Expert Testimony Requirement 
To understand the effect that the legal standard of care for medical 
malpractice has, it is first necessary to grasp the interplay between the 
standard of care and the expert testimony requirement. To establish a 
prima facie case of medical malpractice, Maryland law requires that a 
plaintiff plead and prove through expert testimony, the standard of 
care applicable to the defendant health care provider, that the health 
care provider deviated from the standard of care, that the deviation 
was a cause of the plaintiffs injury, and that damages resulted from 
that injury.19 Expert medical testimony under Maryland law must be 
based on a "reasonable degree of medical probability.,,20 In order for 
a medical expert to produce such testimony, the expert must be 
familiar with the standard of care.21 The law governing the standard 
of care determines what standard the expert must be familiar with 
and, therefore, who is eligible to give the expert testimony medical 
malpractice plaintiffs must provide. 
B. The Three Standards of Care 
1. Strict Locality 
The "strict locality" standard is the most onerous of the three 
standards of care. 22 In Maryland, it was first described as "whether or 
not [the physician] did fail to exercise the amount of care, skill and 
diligence as a physician and surgeon which is exercised generally in 
the community ... in which he was practi[c]ing by doctors engaged 
in the same field.,,23 Under the strict locality rule, plaintiffs must 
provide testimony from an expert familiar with the standard of care 
specific to the defendant physician's community, which usually 
18. See infra Part IV.B. 
19. Rodriguez v. Clarke, 400 Md. 39, 71, 926 A.2d 736,755 (2007). 
20. Kearney v. Berger, 416 Md. 628, 651, 7 A.3d 593, 606 (2010) (quoting Carroll v. 
Konits, 400 Md. 167,211,929 A.2d 19,45 (2007) (Greene, J., dissenting)). 
21. Seeid. at 651-52, 7 A.3dat606. 
22. Marvin Ellin, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Maryland: A Plaintiffs Dilemma, 3 
U. BALT. L. REv. 207,208 (1973). 
23. State ex reI. Solomon v. Fishel, 228 Md. 189, 195, 179 A.2d 349, 352 (1962). 
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requires the expert to practice in the same community as the 
defendant. 24 The rationale behind this rule is that a physician who 
has practiced in a medical community similar to that of the defendant 
physician with the same standard of care might still lack the requisite 
familiarity with the applicable standard to qualify as an expert.25 
2. Similar Locality 
The "similar locality" rule is slightly more relaxed than the strict 
locality rule. 26 This standard was enunciated by the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts in Small v. Howard as requiring "that skill 
only which physicians and surgeons of ordinary ability and skill, 
practi[ c ]ing in similar localities, with opportunities for no larger 
experience, ordinarily possess.,,27 Rather than requiring expert 
testimony as to the standard of care in the specific locality in which 
the defendant physician practices, testimony about a similar locality 
is permissible.28 For instance, under this rule, a doctor familiar with 
the standard of care in a small, rural town in Maryland could provide 
expert testimony against a practitioner in a small, rural town in 
Massachusetts.29 
3. National Standard 
The "national standard" eliminates familiarity with any particular 
location from the analysis.30 This standard was described by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland as the "duty to use that degree of care 
and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in 
the same class to which [the defendant] belongs, acting in the same or 
similar circumstances," taking into account "advances in the 
profession, availability of facilities, specialization or general practice, 
proximity of specialists and special facilities, [and] all other relevant 
considerations.,,3l A doctor familiar with the national standard of 
24. See Ellin, supra note 22, at 208. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. at 216. 
27. Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880), overruled by Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 
N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968). 
28. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 195-96, 349 A.2d 
245,249-50 (1975). 
29. See Ellin, supra note 22, at 216. 
30. See Kobialko v. Lopez, 576 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("[A] doctor 
familiar with the national, uniform standards... is considered sufficiently 
knowledgeable of all localities." (citing Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ill. 
1986))). 
3!. Shilkret, 276 Md. at 200-01,349 A.2d at 253. 
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care can testify under this rule without any familiarity with the 
defendant physician's community or a similar community.32 
C. The Standard of Care Must Be Clear for Plaintiffs 
1. Failing to Establish the Standard of Care 
A plaintiffs failure to establish the applicable standard of care 
will be fatal to a case of medical malpractice. 33 The strict locality 
rule, being the most onerous standard, provides an illustration. In 
Dunham v. Elder, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland34 held 
that a urologist who had never practiced in any capacity in the state 
was not qualified to provide expert testimony as to the standard of 
care under the strict locality rule. 35 The plaintiffs provided a second 
witness who had not practiced in Maryland either and on that basis he 
did not qualify as an expert at trial. 36 Testifying as an "examining 
physician," the second witness stated that the standard of care in the 
defendant physician's specialty was that of a general practitioner, but 
did not testify as to what that standard would entail. 37 The court ruled 
that the plaintiffs did not make a prima facie case of medical 
malpractice because, without a qualified expert, the "testimony was 
insufficient to establish what was the standard of medical care and 
skill required... in Prince George's County," the defendant 
physician's medical community.38 Where the strict locality rule 
demands the exclusion of a critical expert witness, the plaintiff will 
lose the case, as in this example. 
Because the standard of care controls who may provide expert 
testimony, it also controls whom parties in a medical malpractice 
case select as their experts. In order for plaintiffs to provide an 
expert qualified to testify as to the standard of care, the requirements 
for qualifying that expert to the court must be known. Uncertainties 
about the law can cause this selection to be difficult and stressful 
because a plaintiff s claim is at risk. 
32. See Kobialko, 576 N.E.2d at 1047 (citing Purtill, 489 N.E.2d at 874). 
33. See, e.g., Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 366-67, 306 A.2d 568, 572 (1973). 
34. Note, though, that Maryland no longer applies this standard. See infra Part III. 
35 .. Elder, 18 Md. App. at 365, 306 A.2d at 571. The witness was permitted to testify as 
an expert in urology, but not to the applicable standard. Id. 
36. Id. at 366, 306 A.2d at 572. 
37. Id. 
38. ld. at 366-67, 306 A.2d at 572. 
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2. North Carolina's Problems with an Unclear Standard 
Locality rules demand an extra requirement of proving an expert's 
familiarity with the defendant physician's community or a similar 
community. 39 North Carolina applies such a standard, but the 
familiarity requirements under North Carolina law are uncertain.40 
North Carolina's experience illustrates the importance of clarifying 
the familiarity requirements to ensure plaintiffs have a fair shot at 
acquiring adequate expert testimony. 
North Carolina abandoned the strict locality rule for a same or 
similar communities standard at common law,41 and subsequently 
codified that rule by statute in 1975.42 The North Carolina General 
Assembly's report on that statute indicated that it specifically adopted 
a same or similar communities standard of care to avoid further 
interpretation by the state's high court that "might lead to regional or 
national standards for all health care providers.,,43 
a. The "familiarity" requirement 
Two North Carolina decisions caused much confusion as to the 
degree of familiarity an expert witness must have in order to testify to 
the standard of care in the same or similar community as the 
defendant physician. In Henry v. Southeastern OB-GYN Associates, 
the plaintiffs expert was excluded because he was found to be 
unfamiliar with the medical community in Wilmington, North 
Carolina, the community in which the defendant physician 
39. See id. at 363-64,306 A.2d at 570-71. 
40. See Casey Hyman, Comment, Setting the "Bar" in North Carolina Medical 
Malpractice Litigation: Working with the Standard of Care that Everyone Loves to 
Hate, 89 N.C. L. REv. 234, 236 (2010). 
41. See Wiggins v. Piver, 171 S.E.2d 393,397-98 (N.C. 1970). 
42. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.12 (West 2010). 
Id. 
In any action for damages for personal injury or death arising out 
of the furnishing or the failure to furnish professional services in 
the performance of medical, dental, or other health care, the 
defendant shall not be liable for the payment of damages unless 
the trier of the facts is satisfied by the greater weight of the 
evidence that the care of such health care provider was not in 
accordance with the standards of practice among members of the 
same health care profession with similar training and experience 
situated in the same or similar communities at the time of the 
alleged act giving rise to the cause of action. 
43. Henry v. Se. OB-GYN Assocs., 550 S.E.2d 245, 246 (N.c. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting 
N.C. PROF'L LIAB. INS. STUDY COMM'N, REpORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1976, 
at 32 (1976)), affd per curiam, 557 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 2001). 
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practiced. 44 Plaintiffs argued that the standard of care in the 
defendant's community was a national standard, and because their 
expert could testify as to the national standard of care, it was error to 
exclude his testimony.45 Plaintiffs also argued that their expert was 
familiar with the standard of care in Spartanburg, South Carolina, 
which would be the same standard applied in Durham and Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina.46 
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina rejected both arguments, 
stating that there was no evidence that the national standard of care 
was practiced in the defendant's community, that the standard in 
Durham or Chapel Hill was the standard practiced in the defendant's 
community, or that Durham or Chapel Hill were similar communities 
to Wilmington.47 The court noted that it had "recognized very few 
'uniform procedures' to which a national standard may apply, and to 
which an expert may testify.,,48 The court relied on the intent behind 
the General Assembly's adoption of the similar community rule "'to 
avoid the adoption of a national or regional standard of care for 
health providers. ",49 The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed 
this decision per curiam, providing no guidance as to what level of 
familiarity may have been sufficient. 50 
Four years later, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed 
the lower appellate court's decision in Pitts v. Nash Day Hospital, 
Inc.,s' which held that a medical expert was sufficiently familiar with 
the same or similar medical community as the defendant. 52 As in 
Henry, the expert testified that the applicable standard of care was a 
national standard.53 However, the court looked to the expert's 
testimony as a whole, and held that he met the familiarity 
requirement by testifying that he was similarly trained as the 




47. Id. at 246-47. 
48. Id. at 247 (citing Haney v. Alexander, 323 S.E.2d 430, 434 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) 
(nurses taking and reporting vital signs); Page v. Wilson Mem'l Hosp., 272 S.E.2d 8, 
10 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (nursing practices associated with bedpan use». 
49. Id. at 246 (quoting Page, 272 S.E.2d at 10), aff'd per curiam, 557 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 
2001). 
50. Id. at 530. 
51. Pitts v. Nash Day Hosp., 605 S.E.2d 154 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), affd per curiam, 614 
S.E.2d 267 (N.C. 2005). 
52. Id. at 157. 
53. Id. at 156. 
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Carolina like the defendant, and that the "facilities, equipment, 
funding, and the physical and financial environment of both the 
communities in which [the expert] practiced" and in the community 
in which the defendant practiced were similar. 54 The court also found 
that the expert had practiced in communities with "population[ s] and 
median income[s]" similar to the defendant's medical community, 
relating them as to "population served, rural nature, depressed 
economy, and limitations on resources.,,55 Lastly, before the 
proffered expert testified, he had "observed the community [in which 
the defendant practiced and] noted the size of [the defendant's 
hospital].,,56 The court therefore held that the proffered expert was 
sufficiently familiar with the community's standard to meet the 
expert witness qualifications of North Carolina's same or similar 
communities standard, but again defined no evidentiary standard that 
the expert had met. 57 
From the Henry and Pitts decisions, it is difficult to ascertain the 
requirements for establishing an expert's familiarity with the 
defendant physician's community under the same or similar 
communities standard. These cases perhaps did just as much to 
confuse the requirements as to clarify them for North Carolina. 58 
b. Maintaining "flexibility" 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina had its chance to clarify the 
state's standard of care requirements when it was handed two more 
cases with expert familiarity at issue: 0 'Mara v. Wake Forest 
University Health Sciences 59 and Crocker v. Roethling.60 The court, 
however, passed again on an opportunity to set clear guidelines for 
establishing an expert witness's familiarity with the same or similar 
communities as the defendant physician.61 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina determined the review of 
O'Mara was improvidently allowed and therefore did not decide on 
the case.62 The court's decision in Crocker added just as little clarity. 
In Crocker, the trial court excluded the plaintiffs expert because his 
54. Id. at 156-57. 
55. Id. at 157. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 199. 
58. See Hyman, supra note 40, at 236. 
59. 646 S.E.2d 400 (N.c. Ct. App. 2007), disc. review improvidently allowed by 678 
S.E.2d 658 (N.C. 2009). 
60. 646 S.E.2d 442 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), rev'd, 675 S.E.2d 625 (N.C. 2009). 
61. Hyman, supra note 40, at 237. 
62. 678 S.E.2d at 658. 
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affidavit lacked evidence that he was familiar with the standard of 
care in the same or similar community as the defendant. 63 The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a "trial court may not 
automatically disqualify an expert witness simply because the witness 
indicates reliance on a national standard of care during a discovery 
deposition.,,64 The court stated that while the plaintiff does have a 
duty to establish the witness's familiarity with the same or similar 
communities in which the defendant practiced, it does not have to be 
done at the discovery deposition stage.65 
The expert's sworn affidavit stated that he had "reviewed 
information" about care in the defendant physician's community, the 
defendant, and the defendant's practice. 66 The affidavit also stated 
plainly that the expert was familiar with the relevant standard of care 
in the defendant's community at the time of the alleged malpractice.67 
The Crocker court stated that there was no requirement under North 
Carolina law for the expert to provide "documentation of his research 
or attempt to explain to the trial judge how his knowledge about the 
community enabled him to ascertain the relevant standard of care.,,68 
However, the only guidance provided by the court, as to fulfilling the 
familiarity requirement, is a recommendation that "the trial court [ s] 
should apply well-established principles of determining relevancy 
under Evidence Rules 40 I and 70 I ,,69 and that, because the court 
desires to "preserve flexibility," many methods of becoming familiar 
with a given community are possible. 70 
The court continues to adhere to this non-standard, which has 
prompted the following riddle: "When is a board certified doctor with 
20 years of directly related surgical experience not qualified to testify 
as a surgical expert on the standard of care in a medical malpractice 
case? When he or she is asked to testify in a North Carolina 
courtroom.,,7! Unclear standards like those in North Carolina create 
an unfair situation for plaintiffs who could have their case thrown out 
if they fail to meet arbitrary familiarity requirements. 
63. 675 S.E.2d at 627. 





69. Jd. at 632. 
70. Jd. at 631. 
71. Mark Canepa, Making Your Way Through the Minefield of Expert Witness Selection 
in Malpractice Cases in North Carolina, 10 N.C. STATE BAR J. 6, 6 (2005), available 
at http://www.ncbar.comljournaVarchive/Journal%20 1 0,4 .pdf. 
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D. The Standard of Care Must Be Clear for Physicians 
The uncertainty surrounding the standard of care requirements is 
arguably even more stressful for doctors because the critical 
decisions they make, based on what they believe to be the applicable 
standard of care, could be the focus of a medical malpractice claim. 72 
The standard of care must be understood so that doctors know what 
level of care is legally required. 73 Doctors practicing medicine in 
Maryland deserve to know the standard of care they must meet in 
their day-to-day professional life if they are going to be held 
responsible for not meeting it. 74 Doctors that intend to testify as 
expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases also need to know what 
standard applies if they are going to provide an opinion, to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability, on whether a doctor 
breached the required standard.7s 
In a June 2007 article written by three doctors, at least two of 
whom studied medicine in the Maryland area, the authors argue that 
"adherence to the locality rule can create uncertainty for physicians 
when they must choose between following local practice standards 
and national, evidence-based standards of care.,,76 The article 
advocates a national standard of care to ensure the standard is clear, 
stating that location should only be taken into account when 
considering access to facilities or specialists, not the knowledge or 
skill expected from the physician.77 Considerations of such factors 
can be accomplished under the national standard without a locality 
rule.78 
72. See Sorrel, supra note l. 
73. See Michelle Huckaby Lewis et ai., The Locality Rule and the Physician's Dilemma: 
Local Medical Practices vs the National Standard of Care, 297 lAMA 2633, 2633 
(2007) [hereinafter Physician's Dilemma]. 
74. Id. 
75. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Doctors have come under attack by 
disciplinary boards for allegedly misstating the standard of care. See generally 
Maureen Glabman, Scared Silent: The Clash Between Malpractice Lawsuits & Expert 
Testimony, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, (July-Aug. 2003), available at http:// 
findarticles.comlp/articles/mi_ m0843/is _4_ 29/ai_l 055426 1 7I?tag=content;col 1 
(describing how neurosurgeon Dr. Gary Lustgarten's medical license was threatened 
with revocation by the North Carolina Medical Board for expert testimony he 
provided for a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case). 
76. Physician's Dilemma, supra note 73, at 2633. Note, though, that the authors are 
speaking generally, not just about Maryland. 
77. Id. at 2636. 
78. Maryland's national standard considers such factors. See supra note 31 and 
accompanying text. 
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Michael D. Frakes, a Harvard Law School graduate, has analyzed 
whether changes in the legal standard of care have affected physician 
behavior in states moving from a locality rule standard to a national 
standard. 79 Using cesarean section utilization as a model, the author 
found a significant convergence toward national trends once a 
national standard of care is adopted.80 This shows that at least some 
facets of physician behavior are controlled by the legal standard of 
care, 8 I and that an ultimate decision on the standard of care in 
Maryland might truly affect the care that patients receive from their 
doctors. 
III. EVOLUTION OF MARYLAND'S STANDARD OF CARE 
A. Maryland's Common Law Before 1975 
Prior to 1975, to establish the standard of care for medical 
malpractice in Maryland, parties were bound by a strict locality 
rule.82 In Dunham v. Elder, the court stated that Maryland precedent 
called for the application of the strict locality rule, but seemed 
hesitant, noting that the rule was a minority view, which most 
jurisdictions shied away from. 83 The Court of Appeals in Raitt v. 
Johns Hopkins Hospital addressed the Dunham court's concerns, and 
held that even under a strict locality rule, excluding any proffered 
witness who had not practiced in Maryland was improper because 
that was only one factor in the inquiry. 84 
B. Maryland's 1975 Shilkret Decision 
1. Abandonment of the Strict Locality Rule 
In 1975, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reexamined the strict 
locality rule in Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital 
79. Michael D. Frakes, Essays on Malpractice Law and Physician Behavior, 18 (June 
Z009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 
available at http://dspace.mit.edulbitstreamlhandle/l721.1/49706/436449488.pdf? 
sequence= I. 
80. Jd. at 57-58. 
81. See id. 
8Z. Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 364, 306 A.Zd 568, 571 (1973). 
83. Jd. at 364-65, 306 A.Zd at 571. However, the court said that the plaintiff had not 
provided sufficient evidence as to any standard of care, so the issue of what the 
standard of care should be in Maryland was not before the court. Jd. at 366, 306 A.Zd 
at 571. The Court of Special Appeals decided Dunham just two years before 
Maryland would adopt a national standard of care. See infra Part lI.B.3. 
84. Raitt v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 274 Md. 489, 500-01, 336 A.2d 90, 96 (1975). 
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Association. 85 The court stated that the strict locality rule was created 
to protect physicians in remote rural areas from being held to the 
same standard as physicians in urban areas who have better access to 
modem medical research, medical techniques, and facilities. 86 Such a 
rule had become less necessary with the "national accrediting 
system[,] which ha[ d] contributed to the standardization of medical 
schools throughout the country," and advances in communication 
(essentially equal access for all physicians to resources). 87 According 
to the court, the rule had amounted to collusion, a "'conspiracy of 
silence,''' among local practitioners.88 Because many doctors refused 
to provide expert testimony against doctors they knew, and because 
plaintiffs were required to use doctors from the same locality as the 
defendant physicians for their expert witnesses, plaintiffs could 
almost never have a successful case. 89 Also problematic were 
situations in which a sole practitioner, the only physician In a 
locality, could effectually define their own standard of care.90 
2. Rejection of the Similar Locality Rule 
The Shilkret court then considered the similar locality rule. 91 The 
court stated that this standard can answer some of the problems 
associated with the strict locality rule (such as collusion and sole 
practitioner problems), 92 but it did not "effectively alleviate the other 
potential problem, a low standard of care in some of the smaller 
communities, because the standard in similar communities is apt to 
be the same.,,93 The court also identified the additional difficulty in 
defining what communities are similar.94 While the court noted that 
85. 276 Md. 187,349 A.2d 245 (1975). 
86. Jd. at 193,349 A.2d at 248. 
87. Id. at 194,349 A.2d at 249. 
88. Id. (quoting Case Note, Michigan Abandons "Locality Rule" with Regard to 
Specialists, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 435, 438 (1971}). 
89. Id. 
[The] strict locality standard could create a harsh result-the 
possibility that a plaintiff might be left without a remedy in a 
locality which had only one physician, in a locality where all 
physicians were below the standards generally set for rural 
communities or where a "conspiracy of silence" in the plaintiff's 
locality eliminated the possibility of securing expert testimony. 
Case Note, supra note 88, at 438 (footnote omitted). 
90. Shilkret, 276 Md. at 193-94,349 A.2d at 249. 
91. Id. at 195-96,349 A.2d at 250. 
92. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
93. Shilkret, 276 Md. at 196, 349 A.2d at 250. 
94. Id. 
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some states had moved to a similar community standard, the court 
expressly rejected its adoption for Maryland.95 
3. Adoption of the National Standard of Care 
Lastly, the court discussed the national standard of care.96 The 
court stated that a national standard of care was well justified, noted 
the superiority of accredited medical institutions compared to medical 
schools of the past, and stated: 
[V]astly superior postgraduate training, the dynamic impact 
of modem communications and transportation, the 
proliferation of medical literature, frequent seminars and 
conferences on a variety of professional subjects, and the 
growing availability of modem clinical facilities are but 
some of the developments in the medical profession which 
combine to produce contemporary standards that are not 
only much higher than they were just a few short years ago, 
but also are national in scope.97 
The court ultimately decided to abandon locality rules in favor of a 
national standard of care in Maryland.98 Therefore, a physician from 
any locality who was familiar with the national standard of care could 
provide expert testimony in a Maryland medical malpractice case. 99 
C. Maryland's 1993 Enactment of § 3-2A-02(c) 
Eighteen years later in 1993, while the Shilkret national standard 
was still the law of Maryland, the Maryland General Assembly 
inserted § 3-2A-02( c )100 into the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article of the Maryland Code (now section 3-2A-02(c)(I)) through 
the enactment of House Bill 1359, which read as follows: 
In any action for damages filed under this subtitle, the 
health care provider is not liable for the payment of 
damages unless it is established that the care given by the 
health care provider is not in accordance with the standards 
of practice among members of the same health care 
95. Id. at 198-99,349 A.2d at 251-52. 
96. Id. at 199-200, 349 A.2d at 252-53. 
97. Id. at 199,349 A.2d at 252. 
98. Id. at 199-200, 349 A.3d at 252-53. 
99. Id. at 200, 349 A.2d at 252-53. 
100. 1993 Md. Laws 529, 546. 
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profession with similar training and experience situated in 
the same or similar communities at the time of the alleged 
act giving rise to the cause of action. 101 
The legislation could be argued as an abandonment of Maryland's 
national standard for a similar locality rule (like that discussed in 
Shilkret), but the statute has not been acknowledged as a change by 
the Court of Appeals. 102 When interpreting the statute, it is presumed 
that the legislature knew the law, and therefore, by using language 
that annunciates an entirely different standard of care, must have 
intended to alter the standard. 103 
In construing a statute, [the court will] look first to the plain 
language of the statute, and if that language is clear and 
unambiguous, [the court will] look no further than the text of the 
statute. A plain reading of the statute assumes none of its 
language is superfluous or nugatory. 104 
The phrase "same or similar communities" does not appear to be 
ambiguous. The preceding language indicates that it is an evidentiary 
issue: "[T]he health care provider is not liable... unless it is 
established that the care given... is not in accordance with the 
standards of practice among members. .. situated in the same or 
similar communities .... ,,105 
The next step to determine legislative intent is to look at the 
statute as a whole, the prior case law, and the legislative history. 106 
Unfortunately, the legislative history is essentially nonexistent. 107 
The only information available is that the Conference Committee 
101. Id. (emphasis added). 
102. See Terry L. Trimble, Recent Development, Delegates Deliver a Deathblow to 
Maryland's Health Claims Arbitration System, 55 MD. L. REv. 893, 899 (1996). 
103. In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 576, 458 A.2d 75, 76 (1983) ("The 
cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative 
intent. . .. The General Assembly is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, 
full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the 
subject of the statute and the policy of the prior law.") 
104. Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 349-50, 958 A.2d 356,361 (2008) (citation omitted. 
105. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-02(c)(1) (2011). 
106. Newell, 407 Md. at 641, 967 A.2d at 766. Even if a statute seems clear, an inquiry 
does not have to stop with the plain language of a statute, and other persuasive 
material may be taken into account for its interpretation. Kaczorowski v. Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505,514-15,525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987). 
107. See Loden, supra note 5, noting that the "provision was inserted at the last minute, 
without adequate testimony, and has not been discussed in the media or understood by 
the public." 
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rejected the Senate Amendments to House Bill 1359 and adopted the 
Conference Committee Amendments, which included § 3-2A-02( c) 
as Amendment No.4. \08 The same or similar communities language 
is not used elsewhere in the statute. This provides no evidence of the 
legislature's intent other than that the language was only to apply to § 
3-2A-02(c) entitled, "Establishing liability of health care provider; 
qualifications of persons testifying. ,,109 These sources provide 
meager guidance as to the legislature's intent, and the case law 
following the statute's enactment IS no more helpful for 
interpretation. I 10 
D. Maryland's Standard oJ Care Jurisprudence 1993-2011 
Since the same or similar communities language was inserted into 
the Maryland Code in 1993, the Court of Appeals has cited both 
Shilkret and § 3-2A-02( c) as authority for the standard of care in 
Maryland, but has never addressed whether the statute modifies the 
standard announced in Shilkret. lll The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit all have cited § 3-2A-02(c)(1) 
and used the statutory language, "same or similar communities," 
when describing the standard of care in Maryland. I 12 However, since 
the court's adoption of the national standard of care in 1975, Shilkret 
has been cited in almost every medical malpractice decision reported 
in Maryland, and has never been overruled by the Court of 
Appeals. l13 
108. See 1993 Md. Laws 529, 546. Included among the legislative history, available on 
microfilm at the Maryland State Law Library, is an article by Dan J. Loden, originally 
from the "Law Watch" section of THE MARYLAND LAWYER dated Saturday, 
September 18, 1993, concerning the same or similar communities provision. See 
Loden, supra note 5. Also included is a photocopy of North Carolina's same or 
similar communities standard codified in North Carolina's General Statutes § 90-
21.12. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
109. CTS.&JUD.PROC. § 3-2A-02(c)(2011). 
110. The effect of the "same or similar communities" language was not addressed until 
Daee v. Lucas, discussed infra Part IILE. 
Ill. Daee v. Lucas, No. 2485, slip op. at 14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 15,2011). 
112. Brooks v. Md. Gen. Hosp, Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 713 (4th Cir. 1978); Dingle v. Belin, 
358 Md. 354, 368, 749 A.2d 157, 164 (2000); Wa1dt v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 
181 Md. App. 217, 243, 956 A.2d 223, 238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008). 
113. See Trimble, supra note 102, at 899 & n.50. 
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There are approximately 600 medical malpractice claims filed 
every year in Maryland,114 but not one appellate decision has even 
suggested that the Shilkret standard had been abandoned. 115 In 
Dingle v. Belin,116 the Court of Appeals cited the Shilkret standard 
directly before using the statutory language of § 3-2A-02(c)(1), and 
did not indicate that the statutory language meant anything different 
than the Shilkret standard. 117 The case law is therefore unhelpful for 
interpreting the statute. 
E. Maryland's 2011 Daee Decision 
Although the courts have cited both Shilkret and § 3-2A-02(c) as 
authority for the standard, there are no reported cases in which an 
expert's qualifications have been challenged based on the statutory 
same or similar communities language. 118 A Maryland appellate 
court has only recently addressed the issue. 
1. The Trial 
In Daee v. Lucas, a wrongful death action ansmg out of the 
treatment of a gunshot injury, plaintiffs offered two expert witnesses 
at trial. 119 Plaintiffs established their first expert's education, training, 
and experience as a surgeon through voir dire. 120 Defense counsel, 
after conducting their own voir dire, objected to the witness "being 
114. See FRANK CLEMENTE & NEAL PATTISON, PUB. CITIZEN'S CONGo WATCH, THE FACTS 
ABOUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN MARYLAND II fig. 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.citizen. orgidocumentslMaryland_MedMal_Report_2004.pdf. 
115. See Trimble, supra note 102, at 899 & n.50. 
116. 358 Md. 354, 749 A.2d 154. 
117. Id. at 368. This section of Dingle reads: 
The negligence consists of the breach of the duty that a physician 
has "to use that degree of care and skill which is expected of a 
reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to which [the 
physician] belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances." 
Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp., 276 Md. 187, 200, 349 
A.2d 245,252 (1975). To recover in such an action, the plaintiff 
must show that the doctor's conduct-the care given or withheld by 
the doctor-was not in accordance with the standards of practice 
among members of the same health care profession with similar 
training and experience situated in the same or similar 
communities at the time of the act (or omission) giving rise to the 
cause of action. See Maryland Code, § 3-2A-02( c) of the Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Article. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
118. Daee v. Lucas, No. 2485, slip op. at 14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 15,2011). 
119. Id. at 5. 
120. Id. at 6. 
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qualified as an expert on pancreatic surgeries and as a trauma 
surgeon.,,121 
The court overruled the objection, "noting that Dr. Daee's 
objection went to the weight to be afforded [to the expert's] 
testimony, not his qualifications.,,122 The expert witness then testified 
to various breaches in the standard of care, without which, he 
claimed, the doctor's patient would still be alive.123 He based his 
opinions on what he said was "the known standard" that he knew 
from his training. 124 The parties stipulated to the qualifications of the 
second expert witness. 125 
The defendant moved for judgment at the close of the plaintiffs' 
case, arguing that the plaintiffs had not proven the standard of care in 
the same or similar communities as the defendant physician. 126 This 
motion was denied, renewed at the close of all the evidence, and 
denied again. 127 The jury was instructed about the standard of care, 
without objection by the defendant, according to Maryland Civil 
Pattern Jury Instruction 27: I as follows: "A health care provider is 
negligent if the health care provider does not use that degree of care 
and skill which a reasonably competent health care provider, engaged 
in a similar practice and acting in similar circumstances, would 
use.,,128 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. 129 
2. The Appeal 
The Court of Special Appeals discussed the conflict between the 
Shilkret standard and the statutory same or similar communities 
language, and noted that "there are no reported cases ... challenging 
an expert's qualifications to testify based on [the same or similar 
communities] standard or explaining the manner of establishing that 
this standard has been met.,,130 The court held that the statutory same 
or similar communities requirement is a foundational requirement 
121. Id. at 6-7. 
122. !d. at 7. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 8. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 9. 
127. Id.at9-1O. 
128. !d. at 10 (citing MD. CiVIL PlI 27:1 (Md. State Bar Ass'n, Inc. 2009». 
129. !d. at 4. 
130. Id. at 14. 
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"satisfied through the voir dire qualification of the expert witnesses 
who are called to testify about the standard of care.,,131 
One reason the court provided for characterizing the statutory 
language as a foundational requirement is the caption of § 3-2A-
02(c), which reads, "[e]stablishing liability of health care provider; 
qualifications of persons testifying.,,132 The court also noted that 
defense counsel had treated the issue as foundational by establishing 
his own experts' familiarity with the standard of care in the same or 
similar community as the defendant physician through voir dire 
questioning. 133 
The court found that the voir dire testimony in this case provided 
sufficient evidence to qualify the plaintiffs' two expert witnesses. 134 
The court then held that, because the defendant did not challenge the 
experts on the basis that their "training, experience, and 
knowledge ... did not pertain" to the same or similar community as 
the defendant physician, that issue was waived for appellate 
review. 135 The court also held that there is no obligation that an 
admitted expert "opine specifically that [the defendant] deviated from 
the standard of care practiced 'in the same or similar communities' as 
[that of the defendant].,,136 
IV. WHAT SHOULD MARYLAND DO? 
The Court of Special Appeals in Daee decided that § 3-2A-02(c) 
applies to an expert witness's qualifications when proffered to the 
court, but does not apply to the sufficiency of the expert's testimony 
once admitted. 137 The court proposed a framework that could give 
some effect to the same or similar communities language, but gave 
little rationale for doing SO.138 The court also provided no guidance 
as to how an expert's familiarity with the defendant's community will 
be analyzed when the expert's qualifications are challenged. The 
13l. ld. at 15. 
132. ld. at 16. 
133. ld. at 17 n.12. 
134. Id. at 16. 
135. Id. at 16-17. 
136. Jd. at 17. Appellees, in hannony with the Amicus Curiae, argued that such a 
requirement elevates form over substance. Brief of Appellee at 22-23, Daee v. Lucas, 
No. 2485 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 15, 20 11); Brief of Maryland Ass'n for Justice as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 8-9, Daee v. Lucas, No. 2485 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. Feb. 15,2011). 
137. Daee, No. 2458, slip op. at 15,17-18. 
138. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33. 
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Court of Appeals could easily decide not to follow the decision 
strictly. 
A. Possible Decisions 
1. Avoid the Statute 
There is essentially no legislative history behind the insertion of 
section 3-2A-02(c) through the enactment of House Bill 1359.\39 The 
Court of Appeals could avoid the same or similar communities 
language by finding no clear legislative intent that § 3-2A-02(c) 
should supersede Shilkret's national standard of care. This is an 
unlikely scenario, as the court will usually give deference to the 
legislature's choice to include the particular language. 140 
Alternatively, the court could fmd that while the statute adopts the 
same or similar communities legal standard in Maryland, Maryland's 
statewide medical standard of care is still the national standard. This 
is a reasonable path as it recognizes the reality of modem day 
medical care-that physicians, most of whom are Board Certified, 141 
and hospitals, most of which are nationally accredited, 142 are 
practicing medicine according to a national standard of care. Even if 
there is a same or similar communities requirement for expert 
testimony, any expert familiar with the national standard may testify 
because the physicians in every community in Maryland have applied 
the national standard of care since the Shilkret decision. Essentially, 
because Shilkret imposed a national standard of care in every medical 
139. See supra notes 107--08 and accompanying text. 
140. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
141. See States' Doctors Compared By HealthGrades, HEALTHGRADES (Nov. 17, 2005), 
http://www.healthgrades.comlmedialdms/pdflPhysicianComparisonPressReleaselll7 
05.pdf. Maryland ranked 15 out of the 50 states and D.C. for percentage of doctors 
board certified in their specialty (90.02%). Id. at 2 tbl.l. 
142. See Maryland Hospital Peiformance Evaluation Guide: Overview of Maryland 
Regulatory System for Hospital Oversight, MD. HEALTH CARE COMM'N, http:// 
mhcc.maryland.gov/consumerinfo/hospitalguide/patients/other _ infonnationloverview 
_oCmarylandJegulatory_systemJor_hospital_oversight.html (last updated Oct. 7, 
2010). 
Id. 
The Joint Commission (TJC) approves all acute-care 
hospitals. TJC is an independent, not-for-profit group that 
evaluates and accredits health care organizations and programs in 
the United States .... 
Once a hospital has received TJC accreditation ... Maryland 
renews the hospital's license. Maryland does not require the 
OHCQ to review a hospital that the TJC has accredited .... 
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community across Maryland, the communities cannot now be 
differentiated-there is no going back. 
2. Apply the Statute 
The court could find that the General Assembly intended to adopt 
a same or similar communities standard. It is entirely possible that 
the statute only overrules the limited portion of Shilkret that held that 
the standard of care is national rather than based on locality. 143 It 
could keep intact the holding "that a physician is under a duty to use 
that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably 
competent practitioner in the same class to which he belongs, acting 
in the same or similar circumstances."I44 This explains how the Court 
of Appeals could cite both the Shilkret standard and the statutory 
language without identifying a conflict: the Shilkret holding can be 
applied under a same or similar communities standard. 145 The 
rationale for such a decision could mimic that of the Court of Special 
Appeals in Daee,146 or it would be appropriate for the court to 
examine scholarly writing from both the legal and medical fields to 
see what those professionals believe the legislature intended. 147 
An example of such persuasive evidence is provided in comment 
A.l. under Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 27:1 148 titled, 
"Health Care Providers - Standard ofCare.,,149 Section 3-2A-02(c) is 
cited and described as "establishing [the] locality rule, overruling 
Shilkret in part.,,150 This shows that the lawyers and judges that help 
to guide the way Maryland law is practiced, as well as explained by 
143. Shilkret, 276 Md. 187,200,349 A.2d 245,253 (1975). 
144. Id. 
145. See Dingle v. Belin, 358 Md. 354, 368, 749 A.2d 157, 164 (2000). 
146. See supra Part III.E.2. 
147. See Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 
A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987). 
Id. 
When [the Court] pursue[s] the context of statutory language, 
[it is] not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed in 
the Annotated Code. [It] may and often must consider other 
"external manifestations" or "persuasive evidence," including ... 
other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of 
legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within 
which [it] read[s] the particular language before [it] in a given 
case. 
148. Interestingly, this instruction was read to the jury in Daee, but the court did not note 
the discussion in comment A.l. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
149. MD. CIVILPJI 27:1 (Md. State Bar Ass'n, Inc. 2009). 
150. Id. at cmt. A-I. 
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judges to the jury, understand the statute as an adoption of a same or 
similar communities standard. 
In the Physician's Dilemma article, Maryland was noted as having 
a same or similar communities standard, distinct from those states 
with a national standard. 151 This indicates that there are at least some 
in the medical field who understand the standard of care in Maryland 
to follow a same or similar communities rule. It may be useful 
information for the courts to know what the majority of health care 
providers in Maryland understand the standard of care to be. 152 
While these may not be the traditional sources utilized by the 
courts to interpret statutory language, at the very least they provide an 
interesting reflection. Even if only a minority of those examining the 
standard of care understand it to have been changed by § 3-2A-02(c), 
this still shows that there is a question that must be answered. 
B. The Court of Appeals Should Address All Standard of Care 
Issues up Front in Order to Avoid the Problems Exemplified by 
North Carolina 
If the court decides that Maryland has adopted a same or similar 
communities standard, the Maryland courts will face the additional 
issues foreseen by the Shilkret court when it considered the similar 
locality rule in 1975.153 The first issue will be how to define what 
makes medical communities similar. The second issue will be how to 
determine the degree of community familiarity required for an expert 
witness to qualify. The Maryland courts will need to address these 
questions sufficiently in order to avoid a chaotic and unfair situation 
for plaintiffs who would now have to acquire expert witnesses that 
"both conform to the 'same or similar' community standard but still 
have sufficient expertise to qualify as experts.,,154 
Medical malpractice jurisprudence in Maryland courts must avoid 
going the way of the North Carolina courts. The Supreme Court of 
North Carolina has stated that its system evidences a desire to 
"preserve flexibility in ... proceedings" concerning an expert 
witness's familiarity with the same or similar communities in which 
the defendant practices. 155 The proverbial three-dollar value of 
"flexibility" will give little comfort to plaintiffs who miss out on the 
151. Physician's Dilemma, supra note 73. 
152. This could provide rationale for the decision that the standard in every Maryland 
community is national. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
153. See supra Part III.B.2. 
154. Loden, supra note 5. 
155. Crocker v. Roethling, 675 S.E.2d 625,631 (N.C. 2009). 
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compensation they deserve simply because they were given unclear 
guidance on how to meet the familiarity requirement. 
Maryland's same or similar communities statute is unique from 
North Carolina's adoption of that standard in a number of ways. 
First, Maryland would be moving, legally, from a national 
standard,156 while North Carolina moved directly from a strict locality 
rule. 157 Second, the medical communities of Maryland have been 
operating under the national standard prior to any change,158 whereas 
North Carolina's medical communities never operated under a strictly 
national standard. 159 Third, the North Carolina General Assembly 
stated its intent in adopting a same or similar communities standard, 
which was to avoid a national standard. 160 The Maryland General 
Assembly did not state its intention behind the language of § 3-2A-
02( c), and the statute lacks crucial legislative history. 161 Last, North 
Carolina's transition began at common law, so when the North 
Carolina General Assembly codified the rule by statute, case law 
already existed to guide the courtS. 162 Maryland's case law provides 
no guidance outside the national standard of care established In 
Shilkret. 163 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has much more room to 
interpret § 3-2A-02(c) than did the North Carolina Court with its 
same or similar communities statute. This could be a good thing if 
the court keeps the pitfalls North Carolina faced in mind, but it could 
mean a potentially bigger mess if they do not. Leaving the 
familiarity requirements undecided would allow the Court of Appeals 
to wait and see how the standards develop in the trial courts, but this 
can be a problem where, as in North Carolina, the standard develops 
into one that is unclear and arbitrary. 164 
For the sake of preserving clarity, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland should acknowledge that the medical standard of care 
across Maryland is a national standard by continuing to allow all 
physicians familiar with the national standard of care to qualify as 
experts. However, if the court chooses to differentiate medical 
communities in Maryland, it should do so only prospectively and 
156. See supra Part Ill.B. 
157. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra Parts III.B, III.D. 
159. See supra Part II.C.2. 
160. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 107--08 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra Part III.D. 
164. See supra Part II.C.2.a. 
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provide clear guidelines for establishing an expert's requisite 
familiarity with a community and what makes two communities 
sufficiently similar. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under the national standard of care, which was adopted by 
Maryland's highest court in 1975, the expert testimony requirements 
are clear. To plunge into unclear waters at the direction of insurance 
company lobbyists165 is unwise and counterproductive. If the 
Maryland courts decide to require expert witnesses in medical 
malpractice cases be familiar with the same or similar communities in 
which the defendant health care provider practices, they must do so 
prospectively and establish a clear standard for proving sufficient 
familiarity. When compensation for the potentially catastrophic 
injuries involved in medical malpractice cases is on the line, the 
courts must avoid presenting a deficient, vague standard for the sake 
of appearing flexible. 
The courts must also consider the effect that the standard of care 
will have on Maryland's physicians in their professional decision-
making. Fairness and prudence are both important policy 
considerations that require Maryland's courts to be crystal clear as 
the standard of care requirements are determined. It is critical that 
doctors know which standard of care is legally required, not only for 
the sake of fair legal liability, but also for the sake of the patients who 
receive their care. The most prudent decisions should be encouraged 
over substandard community trends. . 
165. 
t 
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See Loden, supra note 5. 
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